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Are ‘the reflective practitioner’ and ‘learning cycles’ suitable
foundations for theories about designing and design cognition
T. Love Edith Cowan University, Perth, Australia

Abstract
This paper challenges the use of the concepts ‘reflective practice’ and ‘learning cycles’ as a basis
for analysing designing, for building coherent theories about human designing, and for developing
design methodologies. It develops the argument via two paths: a review of the original formulation
of the concepts of ‘reflective practice/practitioners’ and ‘learning cycles’; and an analysis of the
implications of recent findings in the areas of brain and neurology research for building theories
about designing. The paper suggests researchers have over extended the use of the reflective
practice and learning cycle concepts: concepts that were devised as relatively coarse structural
formulations bringing together some of the more obvious macroscopic characteristics of individual
human functioning for business consultants and educators. It argues that new micro-level
understandings of design cognition emerging from brain and neurological research offer a better
basis for building theories about designing.
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Are ‘the reflective practitioner’ and ‘learning cycles’ suitable
foundations for theories about designing and design cognition
Introduction
In the design research literature, concepts of reflective practice and its close associate ‘learning
cycles’ have been widely used as the basis for building design theories (see, for example, Craig &
Zimring, 2000; Dorst & Cross, 2000; Dorst & Dijkhuis, 1995; D A Schon, 1992; D A Schon & G,
1992; Stumpf & McDonnell, 2002; Valkenburg & Dorst, 1998). This paper asks whether these
concepts are epistemologically and practically sufficient as structural foundations for developing
design theories that provide full explanations of the human activity of designing and how humans
interact with designed objects. It argues that the theoretical foundations of design research reach
much deeper, and that the concepts of ‘reflective practice’ and ‘learning’ cycles’ are in fact
peripheral, and relatively superficial, models. The paper suggests that models of reflective practice,
learning theories and learning styles essentially model the external phenomena only and are thus not
epistemologically well aligned in purpose with modeling an activity such as designing that is
intrinsically an internal human process. It suggests that the justifiable use of these concepts of
experiential learning does not extend beyond their roles as aids to developing educational programs,
as accessible constructs for students of design practice and design management, and presentation
aids for consultants involved in improving design management.
Brain research is now offering direct insight into the actual internal human processes of designing.
This is a significant change in the design research field. Until recently, design theory making has
been severely limited because research-based understanding of core aspects of human activities in
designing could only be inferred by observations of external behaviours of designers and externally
observable phenomena. The consequence has been that theory making efforts have been deflected
into building theories about designing in terms of the structure and sequencing of externally
observable activities; the properties of objects (forms); information used by or transferred between
those involved in designing; models of social interactions; and human cognition, itself described in
terms of these factors. What has been neglected is the essential core of the field: the human internal
processes of designing, i.e. how humans design.
Trying to model the human activities of designing is difficult: the human processes are complex.
Attempting to take theoretical shortcuts to avoid this complexity by focusing only on superficially
accessible information about the external attributes of the phenomena and the human behaviours
raises similar epistemological and practical problems as trying to infer the internal electronic
circuits and software code of a calculator by observing the contents of is display, or trying to infer
the program code of a word processor from the content of documents that have been produced using
it.
The paper has five parts. In the next (second) section, the reflective practitioner, learning cycle and
learning style models are briefly reviewed. In the third section, research findings about the key roles
that feelings play in cognition and hence designing are outlined in terms of new findings about the
physiological mechanisms by which feelings, emotions, cognition and actions are actualized. In
the fourth section, the issues raised in sections two and three are discussed in terms of the
construction of sound foundations for design theories. In the final section, the conclusion, a new
structure is outlined that repositions the reflective practitioner and learning cycle/style models in
design theory, design research and design education.
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Reflective practice and learning cycles/styles
Schon’s theories of reflective practice, reflective practitioner, and reflection in action originate in
his research into experiential learning and experience-based action undertaken in the 1970s with
Argyris (see, for example, Argyris & Schon, 1978, 1974; D A Schon, 1983; Donald A. Schon,
1973). The primary purpose of this research into individual and organisational learning was the aim
of improving the effectiveness of managers and consultants offering services to increase
organizations’ performance. The theory base of action/experiential learning/ reflective practice goes
back, however, at least to Dewey’s (1933) work on experiential learning.
Schon (1987) focused on two kinds of practical reflection: ‘reflection-in-action’, in which the
reflection is undertaken during a task; and ‘reflection-on-action, in which the reflection is done
away from the task. Schon differentiated between:
•
•
•

Espoused theories – the theories that people say underpin why they do things
Theories in action – the theories that actually underpin why people do things
Reflection – theory that gives feedback into either theory and experience

In exploring the theory aspects of how people best gained from their experiences, Schon focused on
five processes:
•
•
•
•
•

Undertaking an action
Reflections on experience of that action
Using a theory
Reflections on using that theory
Reflections on the idea of reflecting about a theory of e.g. action (meta-theoretical
reflection)

Kolb and Fry developed an alternative approach to experiential learning in the mid-1970s (Kolb,
1975). From this research, and that undertaken earlier by Lewin (e.g. Lewin & Cartwright, 1952;
Lewin & Lewin, 1973), emerged the Kolbian learning cycle of ‘concrete experience’ > ‘observation
and reflection’ > ‘forming abstract concepts’ > ‘testing these abstract concepts in new situations’>
‘more concrete experience’ etc. As Ekpenyong (1999) inferred, this can be seen as an unpacking of
the simple behaviourist stimulus-response (S-R) theory to provide room for a theory of learning.
The experience of Kolb and other educators and consultants in applying the learning cycle in
educational and consultancy situations indicated that individuals performed better and were more
enthusiastic about some parts of the learning cycle than others. This pointed to potential benefits
from categorising individuals in terms of learning styles predicated on their preferred part of the
cycle. These he called Convergers, Divergers, Assimilators, and Accomodators (Kolb, 1985: 6195). Kolb’s learning styles sit between axes on the learning cycle. Alternative learning style
categories by Honey and Mumford (1982) (Activists, Reflectors, Pragmatists and Theorisers) locate
learning styles on the cycle axes. Like the Myers-Briggs and personality types, the cultural roots of
Kolb’s (and presumably Honey and Mumford’s) ideas on learning styles were Jung’s personality
types (Kolb, 1985:78).
These theories about reflective practice, learning cycle and learning styles are grounded in
observation of the behaviour of individuals, groups and larger organisational arrangements. These
observations were made and theories developed alongside a conceptual backdrop of models and
theories from education and psychology. The discourse within the material indicates that the
development of these theories is marked by four significant, but often tacit, factors:
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•
•
•
•

Theory is built on a stimulus - response focus on observable behaviour rather than an
understanding of causal mechanisms.
Theories tacitly assume and presume models of internal human functioning such as
cognition. Where explicit these are also predicated on observation of external responses
rather than knowledge of internal processes.
Epistemology of new theories, and new theories themselves, drawn relatively uncritically
from fields of Psychology and Education.
Theories built on simple mathematical relationship models, e.g. linear relationship, feedback
relationship, circular relationship, oscillatory relationship.

Neurology and physiology as foundations for design theory
Theories of affective cognition model the ways that feelings, body states, conscious and
subconscious thoughts, attention and memory processes influence, or ‘cue’, the formation of new
thoughts and the processes of successive thought development and management (see, for example,
Bastick, 1982; Damasio, 1994; Love, 2000; Mosca, 2000; Ridley, 2002).
Unlike the above simple models of reflection in action, reflection, learning cycles, and learning
strategies and styles, a physiological understanding of how humans design is complex. The
complexity is not born of obscure medical and biological concepts: it is that the processes that go
on inside human’s brains, neurological, hormonal, visceral and other physiological systems are
intrinsically much more complicated, even when the description is limited to understanding them in
terms of the embodied information flows. For example, viewing brain and body processes at a
general level, Damasio (1994, pp. 127-164) describes more than a dozen different neurological and
hormonal pathways and at least ten feedback systems involved in an individual’s perception of an
emotion (not including the cognitive processes such as visualising, bringing out memories, judging,
creating new thoughts, or deciding on actions).
When designing, designers convert problem statements into internal problem gestalts and draw on
their experiences, bodily perceptions (feelings), emotions and external information to generate
multiple partial solutions to these problem gestalts, compare them imagenically ‘in their mind’s
eye’, and communicate these partial design solutions and their associated ‘design worlds’ to others.
It is this level of analysis that is needed for design researchers to have a sound understanding of
how people design, and how people understand, and learn to utilise, designed artefacts, products,
services and systems. Understanding designing and creating the foundations of design theory in
reality requires an understanding of the dozens of separate physiological, neurological,
informatically embodied feedback systems.
In terms of physiological systems, there are several processes / responses that offer a basis for the
reflective practices described by the experiential learning theories of Schon and others. Cognitive
neuroscience models differentiate between two affective system pathways, one of which passes
through the frontal cortex and one that does not. For those aspects of affect that pass through the
frontal cortex, some may be available to conscious attention as ‘body states’, i.e. feelings or quale
(John Dewey, 1895), whilst others come into consciousness as pre-conceptualised entities or
cognitive artefacts (objects in the mind’s eye) realised in the imagenic aspects of the brain.
Each of these form a causal foundation for reflective or experiential learning by which the human
organism responds and learns. The differences between these can be seen, for example, in the
potential responses from an individual putting a finger too close to a candle flame:
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1. Subconscious primitive learning mechanisms resulting in near instant removal – in
which ‘reflective’ processes do not pass though the conscious mechanisms of the frontal
cortex but instead involve subconscious primitive that result in a faster/stronger ‘instinctive’
response next time a similar situation happens.
2. Response based on the individual’s conscious perception of their somato-sensory bodybased feelings: whether direct feelings as in ‘hotness of the fingers’ or of the kineasthetics
of movements, or other body state parameters such as palpitations and muscular tension.
3. Response based on the individual’s attention to the situation as expressed in terms of
cognitive artefacts: (such as ‘flame’, ‘finger’, ‘heat’ and ‘candle’) that are, in whatever way
that they are individually conceptualised, available to the individual’s thinking from their
prior learning.
4. Secondary somato-sensory grounded reflective feedback: due to the individual’s
perception either at the time or later of the above three processes.
In working situations, the above somato-sensory ‘reflective’ processes combine with other
information-based reflective processes. Consider a situation in which a professional in their normal
activity undertakes a task involving an aspect of reflection. Key elements are:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

The actuality of the task
The gestalts and contexts within which the task is undertaken
Their access of memories of previous similar tasks, gestalts and contexts
Their access of memories of outcomes of those tasks and gestalts
In some cases, their access of memories of situations and gestalts prior to undertaking those
similar tasks
Their access of memories of their reflection on the tasks, gestalts, contexts, prior
considerations and outcomes
Their access of memories of their judgement as to the quality of their reflective processes
Their access of memories of their decisions, judgements and heuristics that they developed
as a result of the prior reflective processes
Their analysis of differentiating factors
Their judgement processes that support the professional choices they make in identifying
guidance from these past analyses that influence current behaviour
Their access from memories of the reflection and reflection processes

For each of these information processes, one or more of the four responses in the previous list may
apply. The combination indicates the number of aspects of a simple practical reflective task that
need to be included and addressed by an adequate theory of reflection.
For reflection relating to the human activity of designing the situation is considerably more
complex than that described above because it also has to include a description of the ways that
reflection activities influence the complex processes associated with the generation of new
thoughts: including the simultaneous (or almost so) processing of technical, social, environmental,
ethical and aesthetical information with all its necessary reflection and brain-body/feeling-thought
processes. In addition, alongside these issues must also be added the processes and physiological
pathways associated with designers’ communication of their partially conceived problem
statements, ‘design worlds’, gestalts, partially completed solutions, and the relative evaluation of
Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common Ground : Design Research Society International Conference 2002, UK. ISBN 1-904133-11-8

5

those solutions between designers and other stakeholders. Together, they indicate that a reflective
practice model that satisfactorily explains sufficient of the real human processes to provide a full
explanation and model for improving the outcomes of design activities is considerably more
complex than ‘reflection’ theories based on external observations of individuals’ behaviour.

Discussion
The development of coherent design theories requires that they are grounded on epistemologically
sound foundations capable of supporting required analyses. All forms of theory about designing
explicitly, or tacitly, assume and presume particular underlying theories of human functioning.
Theories derived from the external characteristics of objects, here including human behaviour,
cannot, by their nature, definitively explain or model the internal workings of the objects or, in this
case, the internal human processes. The layered nature of theories; in which individual theories
provide assumptions for less abstract theories and depend on more abstract theories; means it is not
possible for theories that depend on or presume an internal human mechanism of designing to
explain that mechanism.
Four core issues that a body of theory about designing and designs must address are:
1. The explanation of how designing occurs inside an individual.
2. The modelling of how users’ internal processes shape their interactions with design
products, services and systems.
3. The creation of new thoughts.
4. Closure, i.e. the internal human conscious and unconscious automated processes that stop,
start, continue or redirect human external and internal activities.
The sketches in the preceding section also point to a more complex view of learning and reflection
processes than that described in the reflective practice and learning cycle/style literatures. Human
activity at an individual and social level is more complex than the reflective practice/ reflection in
action and learning cycle/style models indicate. Schon’s theories of reflection, action and practice,
Kolb’s learning cycle and the learning styles of Kolb, Honey and Mumford have major limitations
as foundations for building design theories because of their grounding in external observation of
practice, rather than an understanding of what happens inside humans whilst they are involved in
designing. They are unsuited to being foundational to theorising about designing because do not
provide the data or theoretical means to infer and model deeper underlying processes of human
functioning by observing the superficialities of behaviour and practice. This is a limitation that
Schon was well aware of from early on (D. A. Schon, 1987). He identified that what was really
needed was a model of human cognition derived directly from an understanding of human cognitive
processes and not based on observing behaviour. One way of seeing Schon’s theories of reflective
behaviour is that they are an approach that aims to make the best of a difficult situation limited by
the lack of information about human internal processes, and an attempt to maximise the theory
making potential available from external observations and individuals’ subjective perceptions of
their own thoughts, experiences and feelings.
Another way of viewing this situation is in terms of theorising about the internal functioning of a
‘black box’: an approach widely used in systems analyses. (A ‘black box’ being one that nothing is
known about its internal functioning. A ‘white box’ is one in which everything is known about its
internal processes. A ‘grey box’ is somewhere in between.). The models of Schon, Kolb, and Honey
and Mumford regard humans as a ‘black box’ and do not look inside the box. Their theories model
the relationships between humans’ inputs and outcomes rather than trying to understand the feelings
and thoughts and internal human processes that are the causal basis of the humans’ ‘outputs’. In
epistemological terms, these are theories about the behaviour of objects rather than theories that

Durling D. & Shackleton J. (Eds.) Common Ground : Design Research Society International Conference 2002, UK. ISBN 1-904133-11-8

6

explain why human behaviour occurs. The use of ‘black box’ systems theories as tools for
developing predictive and explanatory models is however always limited by lack of knowledge
about the processes inside the ‘black box’. The data about inputs and outputs that is collected, by its
nature, cannot be used to formulate theories about why the behaviour occurs or why and how the
underlying processes and mechanisms are likely to produce other sorts of outcomes. In essence, the
theories are at the level of explanations such as ‘pressing harder on the brake results in the vehicle
decelerating more’ rather than an explanation of how the brake system works and why pressing on
the brake pedal will result in the consequent changes to the vehicle’s speed.
The essential foundational aspect of designing, the creation of new thoughts, the management of
gestalts, the communication of partially completed design possibilities between designers and other
stakeholders in design processes, the interpretations and understanding of function embedded in
designed artefacts, systems and services all depend on underlying human embodied processes.
These can only adequately be explained in terms of the physicality of human processes, i.e. the
moment-by-moment, conscious and unconscious events and processes that result in doing and not
doing particular activities, thinking and not thinking particular thoughts.
The above analysis also points to the weakness and, at this point, failure of traditional rationalist
theories of cognitive science in explaining human designing and the ways that humans interact with
actualised designs. Epistemologically, practically and pragmatically, the only ways to establish
sound foundations for building theory about how human beings undertake designing, and how they
interact with designed products, systems and services is to focus on the internal processes revealed
in the physiology of real humans.
As a postscript to this discussion, it is necessary to acknowledge that theories about reflective
practice, learning cycles and learning styles have been attractive to design educators and
practitioners. In most cases, it appears that the reasons are because they offer political benefits
rather than because they provide sound theory foundations. The most obvious benefits are that they
align well with ideas that:
•
•
•
•
•

Design learning as a master/apprentice relationship
Design critique and evaluation should be based on designers ‘explaining’ their designs or
that designs should ‘explain’ themselves
Experiential learning supports arguments that design education should be based on craft
skills training modalities.
The learning cycle echoes simple models of design process in which a practical design
problem is explored, some ideas for solutions are conceived, these ideas are investigated and
tested, and eventually a plan is chosen or confirmed as a new idea/design.
The segregation of professional expertise into categories indicates that designers are a
unique breed. The learning style divisions fit well with customary biases that designers must
by nature be divergent and free thinking, whereas theoreticians are assimilators building
models of things, engineers and scientists are convergent appliers of models, and
professionals such as managers and manufacturers work with models in concrete, real
environments.

If uncritically viewed, the learning cycle also provides justification for a description of designing in
which the designer/ practitioner starts off from a concrete situation, reflects on the situation, and as
a result of that reflection, produces ideas, and then experiments with them to create new knowledge:
a description that can be interpreted to imply that design practice should be viewed as identical to
research.
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Conclusion
Building sound underlying theories about the activities of designing and the ways that humans use
designed outcomes requires a different and more fundamental approach than that available through
theories of organisational and action learning such as the theories of reflective practice, learning
cycles, and learning styles described earlier.
The development of foundation theories in the areas of designing and the use of designed products
services and systems must go deeper than theories about individual’s reflective practices, sequences
of learning, or simple categories of learning styles. In epistemological terms, these latter models lie
alongside design theories rather that offer foundations for them. Theories based directly on the
underlying human physiological mechanisms of designing, and the embodied mechanisms that
underpin how individuals interact with designed products, services and systems and other aspects of
their external environment offer a sounder foundation for a body of knowledge on designing and
designs. This has not yet been adequately developed in the design research field.
At a pragmatic level, contemporary brain research is beginning to offer simple heuristics on which
to build higher-level design theories. Evidence is emerging that supports some socio-psychological
theories such as the role of attention in Constituent Market Orientation theories, and points to
weaknesses in others as described above. It also offers direct causal explanations (Damasio, 1994)
for anecdotal concepts such as:
1. Light complex, innovative fast modes of thinking are associated with positive, happy,
relaxed body states.
2. Slow, repetitive, limited thinking – associated with tense, negative, painful, distressed body
states
In summary, theories of organisational psychology and experiential learning (such as reflective
practice, learning cycles and learning styles) offer consultants and managers models that indicate
that if certain things are done then certain consequences are likely to result. For educationalists,
they indicate that some educational approaches are more likely to be effective than others in
specific situations when assessed against particular criteria. For those involved in managing
organisational learning processes in commercial organisations, they offer both. Their use as theory
foundations is, however, epistemologically unjustified.
For design researchers wishing to build theory on sound foundations, the human physiological
mechanisms that underpin human creative thinking, feeling, values, judgement, decision-making
and motivation are more appropriate.
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